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WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DELAWARE
BY MARCEL KAHAN AND EDWARD ROCK∗
ABSTRACT
When the federal government is the controlling shareholder, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity transforms the legal structures of accountability. Procedurally, the government and its agents can only be sued in
federal court. Substantively, claims must be brought within one of the
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity (the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
Tucker Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act). Although in the right
circumstances plausible claims could be brought in Delaware against the
directors of a government-controlled Delaware corporation, we argue that
Delaware should avoid a confrontation with Washington, and that the best
way to do so is to take advantage of the flexibility provided by Delaware
Court of Chancery Rule 19.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time in living memory, the federal government owns
controlling stock positions in major private corporations. The United States
Treasury owns 60% of General Motors (GM),1 56% of GMAC,2 26% of
Citigroup,3 and 77.9% of American International Group (AIG),4 all Delaware corporations. In addition, it owns 79.9% of Fannie Mae and 79.9% of
Freddie Mac, both of which are government-sponsored enterprises.5

∗
This is a written version of the 2009 Francis G. Pileggi Distinguished Lecture in Law,
delivered by Edward Rock in Wilmington, Delaware on October 9, 2009. Many thanks to the staff
of The Delaware Journal of Corporate Law and Linda Flaharty for all their hard work in organizing
the lecture and in shepherding this article through publication.
1
See Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M. Future on a Day of Pain,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1.
2
Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. to Give $3.6 Billion More in Aid to GMAC; Move Makes
Government the Majority Owner of Troubled Auto Lender, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2009, at A1.
3
David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Discord Behind TARP Exits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703323704574602552053952422.html; Michael
Corkery, The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Citigroup's Botched Stock Sale, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/12/17/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-citigroups-botched-stock-sale/.
4
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Reports Loss of $61.7 Billion as U.S.
Gives More Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/business
/03aig.hml?pagewanted=1.
5
Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B1.
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When the government is the controlling shareholder, the accountability structures are fundamentally transformed both procedurally and
substantively: any claims against the controlling shareholder are adjudicated
in federal court under federal law, with very uncertain results. Although
claims against officers and directors of Delaware corporations who are not
federal employees can be adjudicated in the Delaware state courts under
ordinary principles of Delaware corporate law, doing so would put Delaware
in a difficult position. In this article, we argue that in such circumstances,
Delaware's optimal strategy is to "duck" such disputes, and we provide a
roadmap for how Delaware should do so.6
A quick glance through the financial pages provides numerous examples of government interference in decisions that traditionally have been
viewed as private management responsibility. A few illustrations will suffice. In the wake of the federal bailout of Chrysler and GM, there was congressional pressure to prevent the closure of GM and Chrysler dealers.7 The
Treasury, beginning with AIG's bonus scandal and continuing through the
work of the compensation "czar" Kenneth Feinberg, has been heavily involved in executive compensation in bailed-out institutions.8 There has been
continual pressure on government-supported banks, including Citigroup, to
increase lending to small businesses and to restructure loans to consumers.9
All of this is only the tip of the iceberg. It reflects instances of federal
pressures that have come to light in the short period of time since the
government obtained control of these various companies. If government
control is not quickly dismantled, these instances are bound to multiply.
Through its position as a creditor, the federal government also controls Bank of America. See
Appelbaum, supra note 2 (noting Bank of America's efforts to repay government aid).
6
To examine an even broader set of issues raised by government ownership, see generally
J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice (George
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-43, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146
1143.
7
Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, Senators Blast Automakers Over Dealer Closings; GM,
Chrysler Defend Massive Shutdowns, WASH. POST, June 4, 2009, at A15.
8
See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront Upsurge of
Populist Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1; see also Brady Dennis, AIG Plans Millions More
in Bonuses; Troubled Insurer Is in Talks with U.S. Over $250 Million, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009,
at A1 (discussing post-bailout regulation of AIG executive bonuses); Liam Pleven & Deborah
Solomon, AIG Seeks Clearance to Release Bonuses, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at C1 (discussing
the same).
9
See, e.g., Christi Parsons & Peter Nicholas, "We Will Rebuild, We Will Recover," L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (quoting President Obama as saying banks "'will have to clearly
demonstrate how taxpayer dollars result in more lending for the American taxpayer'"); see also Ross
Kerber, Banks Draw Heavy Fire from Capitol Hill; Legislators Lash Out, Saying Financial Firms
Haven't Met Their End of the Bailout Bargain, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2008, at B7; Ross Kerber,
Businesses in N.E. Say Lenders Too Strict Terms Toughen, Despite Flow of Federal Funds,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1.
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Perhaps more importantly, the examples above do not reflect any of the more
subtle pressures on companies and their executives that have not yet made it
into the press.
How did we get here? More quickly than one would have thought imaginable. It started in March 2008 with the Treasury and Federal Reserve's
(Fed) ad hoc facilitation of the rescue of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan
Chase.10 It continued with the summer 2008 rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.11 It reached gale force in the September 2008 bailout of AIG and
the October 2008 enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 (EESA), which resulted in the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) that provided investments in Citigroup, Bank of America, and
numerous other banks.12 It culminated in the December 2008 rescue of
GMAC,13 and the spring 2009 bailouts of GM and Chrysler.14
In the course of these high speed rescues, the Treasury acquired stock
(both voting and nonvoting) and warrants in numerous public companies.
To make things even more difficult, the government response was perforce
enacted in haste with shifting goals and minimal guidance on how ownership
positions should be held or managed. Although there is no evidence that the
purpose was to exercise control, the rescues have provided numerous
opportunities for the exercise of control. Stock ownership (especially
controlling stakes) creates the power to interfere, and numerous formal
opportunities to do so (on every issue that must be approved by the shareholders at the annual meeting). Moreover, stock ownership creates virtually
unlimited informal opportunities for various governmental actors to exert
influence and reduces the political cost of interference by diminishing its
salience and visibility. Helpful suggestions, comments, or advice to the
CEO about how to run the company, made by a Treasury official or an important member of Congress at a cocktail party or in a telephone conver-

10

For more details, see generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58
EMORY L.J. 713 (2009) (analyzing how Delaware avoided muddying its corporate law and injecting
itself into international economic policy by deferring tough legal questions to New York courts).
11
See Story, supra note 5 (detailing federal intervention to save Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac).
12
See Matthew Ericson et al., Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, http://
projects. nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table (providing a comprehensive list of recipients of the
TARP funds). For a detailed review of these events, see generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG
TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009).
13
See Appelbaum, supra note 2 (discussing the federal government's assistance of GMAC).
14
See Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, GM, Chrysler Seek Billions More in Aid; Firms to
Cut 50,000 Jobs, Drop 6 Brands, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1.
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sation, carry an entirely different weight when the government controls 30%
to 80% of the company's equity.
In principle, of course, there is nothing wrong with major equity
holders influencing the way their companies do business. Yet, as we argue
below, the presence of the federal government as a controlling shareholder
fundamentally transforms the legal structures of accountability. In this article, we first describe that transformation. We then turn to how it affects Delaware's role in adjudicating intra-corporate disputes and the threats posed to
Delaware's position by federal government involvement. Finally, we discuss how Delaware can "duck."
II. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
A. Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law
To understand the transformation wrought by government control,
consider first the Delaware rules when the controlling shareholder is a
private individual or firm. Figure 1 provides a basic self dealing hypothetical: the fictional Victor Black owns controlling interests of 60% in
Company A and 80% in Company B, and uses his control to lean on
Company A to enter into a contract on preferential terms with Company B.
Victor Black's conflict of interest is clear: he benefits by siphoning money
from Company A (in which he only has a 60% interest) to Company B (in
which he has an 80% stake).
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Figure 1.
The Delaware law governing related party transactions is well
developed. The threshold question is whether Black has control. If Black
controls a majority of the voting power, he is deemed to be a controlling
shareholder.15 If he has a significant but less than majority stake, he is considered a controlling shareholder if he actually controls the corporate
decision making.16 In our hypothetical, Black would be a controlling shareholder of Company A as well as Company B. As a controlling shareholder,
he has, under Delaware law, fiduciary duties to noncontrolling shareholders.17 Delaware law then examines related party transactions under the
duty of loyalty rubric, and applies an "entire fairness" standard.18 "Entire
fairness" is understood to encompass "fair price" and "fair dealing."19

15

See generally 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 151.5.1, at GCL-V-34 (5th ed. 2008) (citing, inter alia, In re Tri-Star
Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)).
16
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994).
17
See id. at 1113-14.
18
Id. at 1115-17.
19
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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In applying the entire fairness standard to related party transactions,
Delaware encourages the use of procedural devices such as the involvement
of independent directors in negotiating and approving such transactions or
ratification by disinterested shareholders. When such devices are used
properly—e.g., if the directors are truly independent and function effectively
and if shareholders receive full disclosure and their vote is uncoerced—they
shift the burden of proof with respect to whether the transaction was entirely
fair to the plaintiff challenging the transaction.20 When a violation of the
duty of loyalty is found, the remedies include an injunction and damages,
measured by reference to arm's-length market transactions.21
In a case like Figure 1, a derivative suit alleging breach of the duty of
loyalty would likely be filed in Delaware Chancery Court. Demand would
probably be excused. Ordinarily, Delaware courts apply to the so-called
Aronson test to determine demand futility.22 Under Aronson, a derivative
plaintiff must allege specific facts that create a reasonable doubt as to
whether (1) a majority of the board is disinterested or independent or (2) the
challenged transaction was the product of the board's valid exercise of
business judgment.23
Given the presence of a controlling shareholder, there will be many
instances in which a majority of the board members either have an interest in
the transaction (e.g., because they represent the controlling shareholder) or
lack sufficient independence (e.g., because they work for the controlling
shareholder or have other business relationships with the controlling
shareholder).24 In these cases, demand will be excused under the first prong

20
See, e.g., Lynch Commc'n, 638 A.2d at 1117. There is some ambiguity in the Delaware
case law. Compare Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (stating, in context of
self-dealing transaction involving controlling shareholder, that approval by properly functioning
committee of independent directors would shift burden on entire fairness standard to plaintiffs), with
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating, in context of merger involving
material conflict of interest on part of controlling shareholder, that entire fairness applies ab initio
only to freeze-out mergers with controlling shareholders). Orman v. Cullman thus raises the
possibility that entire fairness does not apply to all transactions involving controlling shareholders,
but only to a subset, namely, freeze-out mergers.
21
See Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("In
determining damages, the court's 'powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and
monetary relief as may be appropriate.'" (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714)).
22
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984).
23
Id.
24
See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1270-73 (Del. Ch. 2008) (excusing demand
where the board appointed an overseer who solicited sham bids and ultimately awarded a contract to
his own company). But see Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051-52 (Del. 2004) (refusing to
excuse demand where controlling shareholder and founder exercised 94% voting power and had
close personal friendships with board members).
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of Aronson. Perhaps more importantly, if the self-dealing transaction
involving a controlling shareholder is substantively analyzed under the entire
fairness test–and thus not protected by the business judgment rule–there is a
good argument that demand is excused under the second prong of Aronson.25
Such an argument would rest on the fact that, since the transaction is subject
to entire fairness review by the court, there is a reasonable doubt that the
transaction was the product of the board's valid business judgment.
Moreover, independent directors' role in assessing a self-dealing
transaction is closely analogous to independent directors' role in deciding
whether to have the company bring a lawsuit against insiders. In both
instances, they make decisions regarding matters in which they do not have a
direct interest, but in which other board members do. Likewise, a conclusion
that a transaction is protected by the business judgment rule is analogous to a
conclusion that the company should not bring a lawsuit: in both instances,
the court does not review the substance of the underlying decision or
transaction. In a self-dealing transaction with a controlling shareholder,
Delaware law is clear that the transaction is subject to entire fairness even if
approved by independent directors. In imposing this standard, rather than
the business judgment rule, Delaware cases make clear that independent
directors are not sufficiently trusted to dispense with substantive review by
the court (as the effect of approval by independent directors is not
reinstatement of the business judgment rule). Thus, it would make sense if,
in applying the relevant procedural standard, courts likewise did not defer to
independent directors (as they would if demand were not excused in such
cases). Otherwise, the result would be the somewhat odd structure in which
the court says that self-dealing transactions with controlling shareholders are
sufficiently suspect that they are always evaluated under entire fairness, but
that such cases will never make it to court at all if a board (with a majority of
independent directors) decides not to pursue it.
If demand is excused, the court would independently evaluate both the
financial terms of the transaction and the process leading to the transaction
and determine whether they comply with the entire fairness standard. In
short, if the transaction is indeed unfair, there is a significant likelihood that
the plaintiffs would succeed in either enjoining the transaction or recovering
damages. The robust protections provided by the duty of loyalty is a function
of relatively clear rules enforced by private injunctive and damages actions.

25

To our knowledge, no case directly endorses or rejects the proposition that demand is
automatically excused under the second prong of Aronson for self-dealing transactions with
controlling shareholders that, under Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n, are always subjected to entire fairness
review.
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B. Suing the Government as Controlling Shareholder
When the federal government is the controlling shareholder, this
structure of accountability is transformed. Consider a slightly modified
hypothetical: substitute the Treasury for the fictional Victor Black, the
fictional Detroit Motors Acceptance Corporation (DMAC) for Company A
and the fictional Detroit Motors (DM) for Company B, as in Figure 2.
Suppose, further, that the Treasury leans on DMAC to provide financing to
DM, and its dealers and customers, on preferential terms. What sort of
claims would the noncontrolling shareholders have?

Figure 2.
Consider, first, claims against the controlling shareholder, the
Treasury. An initial hurdle is "sovereign immunity," the doctrine according
to which the "sovereign" (i.e., the federal government) may only be sued to
the extent that it gives its permission.26 This has both procedural and
substantive implications.

26
E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1982) ("It is axiomatic that the United
States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction.").
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Procedurally, the law is clear that the federal government and its
agents may only be sued in federal district court or the court of federal
claims, depending on the cause of action.27 Any claims that are brought in
state court may be removed to the appropriate federal court.28
Substantively, only claims within the federal government's waivers of
sovereign immunity may be brought. There are three main waivers: the
Federal Tort Claims Acts (FTCA),29 the Tucker Act,30 and the Administrative Procedure Act.31 The FTCA, as its name indicates, waives sovereign immunity with respect to tort actions.32 The Tucker Act waives immunity with respect to claims against the United States "founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,
or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."33
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for injunctive relief against
agency action, but does not provide for damages.34
Trying to bring a breach of fiduciary duty action against the
government as a controlling shareholder raises a host of fascinating issues.
Is a breach of the duty of loyalty a tort for the purposes of the FTCA?35
Even if the FTCA applies, would the government conduct fall within the
"discretionary functions" exception?36 As we discuss at length elsewhere, a
plaintiff's chances under the FTCA, even for a clear cut violation of the duty
of loyalty, would be highly uncertain and not the sort of case that a rational
lawyer would take on a contingent fee.

27

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2006).
Id. § 1442(a).
29
Id. § 2674.
30
Id. § 1491(a)(1); see also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212 ("[W]e conclude that by giving the
Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, the Tucker Act
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those claims." (footnote omitted)).
31
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
32
28 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable [for tort] . . . to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages.").
33
Id. § 1491(a)(1).
34
5 U.S.C. § 702 (permitting "relief other than money damages").
35
See generally Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3 (2000);
Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the
Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994).
36
Section 2680(a) of title 28 of the United States Code states the FTCA waiver of sovereign
immunity shall not extend to "[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
28
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The Tucker Act issues are every bit as complex. The Tucker Act does
not, itself, create any substantive rights.37 In our hypothetical, would there
be an independent basis for a claim? Although there are some plausible potential claims, success would be uncertain and would depend on an extension of current law.
Finally, under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff would
face a variety of challenges that derive from the odd situation in which the
government is acting in a private setting without either accepting applicable
Delaware law or explicitly opting out. A plaintiff could argue that federal
governmental actions that are inconsistent with Delaware law are "not in
accordance with law" and thus invalid under § 706.38 In response, the government could argue that § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review when "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law" and that the EESA,
which authorized the TARP program, did just that.39 As with the other federal theories, while there are some potential claims, all have uncertain prospects and would require extension of current law.
C. An Alternative Strategy: Suing the Officers and Directors
Delaware's controlling shareholder jurisprudence has two pillars: controlling shareholders owe duties to noncontrolling shareholders in certain circumstances;40 and the officers and directors of controlled corporations,
however they are elected, owe duties to the corporation and all its shareholders.41 When a controlling shareholder uses its power to engineer a conflicted transaction, directors play a special role in protecting the non-controlling shareholders in the Delaware system.42 In this section, we consider
whether there would be plausible claims against the directors of DMAC.
Assume that DMAC has seven directors, two of whom were nominated by
the Treasury (but are not Treasury employees), and all of whom were elected

37

United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2009).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
39
Id. § 701(a)(2).
40
See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *19 (Del.
Ch. June 24, 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), reprinted in 17 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 551, 585 (1992) ("[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of
stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes the duties of care
and loyalty of a director of the corporation.").
41
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) ("[T]he shareholders of
a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their board of directors to discharge each of their
. . . fiduciary duties at all times.").
42
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994).
38
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by a plurality that included the Treasury votes. Assume that the other five
directors were not selected by the Treasury.
Suppose, now, that the board, after the two Treasury-nominated directors report the Treasury's views, decides unanimously to loan money on
preferential terms to DM, its customers, and dealers. What can the shareholders do?
The starting point under Delaware law is that all directors, however
they make it to the boardroom, are expected to attend to the interest of the
corporation and all of its shareholders: "the law demands of directors . . .
fidelity to the corporation and all of its shareholders and does not recognize a
special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class
electing them . . . ."43 The Delaware Supreme Court made it clear in
Weinberger v. UOP that designees of a controlling shareholder are not
thereby insulated from their duties:
[The controlling shareholder] cannot escape the effects of the
conflicts it faced, particularly when its designees on [the] board
did not totally abstain from participation in the matter. There is
no "safe harbor" for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a
transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.
The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that
where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the
burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the
test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
There is no dilution of this obligation where one holds
dual or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context.
Thus, individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two
corporations, one of whom is parent and the other subsidiary,

43

Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 27, 1987), reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 774, 790 (1988); Comm. on Corporate Laws,
ABA Section of Bus. Law, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled Corporation,
45 BUS. LAW. 429, 430 (1989) (noting that "affiliated and unaffiliated directors alike represent all of
the shareholders" and stating that "[a]ll directors have the same duties to the corporation and to all
of its shareholders"); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 766
(2008).
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owe the same duty of good management to both corporations
. . . .44
But this general principle merely frames the inquiry. Weinberger
itself conditioned this strong statement of duty with phrases like "[g]iven the
absence of any attempt to structure this transaction on an arm's-length basis"
and "particularly when its designees on [the] board did not totally abstain
from participation in the matter" and "in the absence of an independent
negotiating structure or the directors' total abstention from any participation
in the matter."45 We now know that each of these conditions has, in fact,
been used to shield conflicted directors and transactions.46
In the decision to loan money on preferential terms to DM, its
customers, and dealers, the Treasury obviously had a conflict of interest. It
is less obvious that any of the directors did. The five "independent" directors, by hypothesis, do not also serve as directors of DM, and are also presumptively independent of the Treasury. The two Treasury-designated directors, by contrast, may face a conflict, depending on their other connections, if any, with the Treasury.
So let's fill out the fact pattern a bit. Suppose that the board discussion proceeds along the following lines: The two Treasury-designated directors explain to the board how important this transaction is to the Treasury
and the public interest. The other directors, in their discussion of the issue,
take seriously the Treasury's concerns, and, moreover, discuss in depth the
value to DMAC of maintaining strong and friendly relations with DMAC's
controlling shareholder, who also plays a regulatory role. After detailed
discussion, the board unanimously decides to make the loans.
In these circumstances, what are the chances that the board members
face monetary liability? The independent directors, as described, have no
direct financial interest in the transaction, and DMAC undoubtedly has a
section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision. To be insulated from liability under
section 102(b)(7), however, they must also have acted in good faith.47 As
the Delaware Supreme Court recently held, lack of good faith may be shown
where "'the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of

44

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
Id. at 710-11 (citation omitted).
46
See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117 ("'[An] independent bargaining structure,
while not conclusive, is strong evidence of the fairness' of a merger transaction." (quoting Rosenblatt
v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 n.7 (Del. 1985))).
47
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) ("[A section 102(b)(7) provision] can
exculpate directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that
is not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.").
45
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advancing the best interests of the corporation.'"48 If evidence can be adduced to show that the board members realized that making the loans was
not in the best interest of DMAC and only approved the loans because of the
pressure exerted by the Treasury and its nominees, they arguably lacked
good faith and could face monetary liability. The same would be true, a
fortiori, for the directors nominated by the Treasury.
On the other hand, the directors could argue that, given the precarious
position of DMAC, its vulnerability to governmental regulation, and its dependence on future bailouts from the Treasury, it is in the best interest of
DMAC to stay on good terms with the government, even if this means
DMAC needs to make loans that—analyzed without regard to these factors—are not in best interest of DMAC.
Whether the Delaware courts would (and should) accept such
arguments is doctrinally unresolved. In effect, it amounts to the directors
arguing that they may, in good faith, approve a detrimental transaction
because the controlling shareholder has the power to retaliate and inflict
even worse damage on the corporation. A similar argument (in a case
involving a private controlling shareholder) was rejected by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.49 In that
case, however, the court merely held that the approval of directors that were
so motivated did not constitute an effective cleansing act (and thus did not
result in shifting the burden of showing entire fairness).50 The issue of
whether the directors so motivated acted in good faith was not before the
court. In a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery—In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation51—the court held that an
outside director was not independent and not shielded from liability by
section 102(b)(7) because he possessed special expertise that should have led
him to conclude that the transaction proposed by a controlling shareholder
was unfair.52 The court concluded that the director was motivated by the
potential future business opportunities he could obtain from the controlling
shareholder.53 While neither Kahn v. Lynch nor Emerging Communications
resolves the issue, they show that a potential for personal liability exists, especially for any nonindependent directors.

48

Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
See 638 A.2d at 1113. In this case, the board of directors approved a merger with the
corporation's controlling shareholders after the controlling shareholder threatened to proceed with a
hostile tender offer at a lower price if the transaction was not approved. Id. at 1118.
50
See id. at 1120-21.
51
No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).
52
Id. at *35-40.
53
Id. at *35.
49
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Note, however, that as long as the Treasury-appointed directors act in
good faith, any further claims against them are unlikely to succeed. Specifically, their role in truthfully conveying the Treasury's views cannot be criticized. Surely this is something that the board should know about.54 Furthermore, even if they vote, their votes were not the but-for cause of the
decision; it would have passed whether they voted for it or not.55
But even if both the independent and the Treasury-appointed directors
are shielded from personal liability by section 102(b)(7), plaintiffs might
pursue a case in order to secure an injunction to block the loan and to prohibit future loans. Even this, however, could be a challenge. Let us assume
that disinterested directors who decide, after careful deliberation, to favor a
controlling shareholder who holds the power of life and death over the company are viewed as acting in good faith, and thus would not have breached
their fiduciary duties. Still, the problem remains that it was the demands of
the controlling shareholder that placed the board in an impossible position.
And, as we saw above, the controlling shareholder in this case seems to be
largely beyond the reach of Delaware law.
Suppose, however, that we focus on the transaction itself rather than
on the directors, even if the suit is formally against them. Interestingly, and
in recognition of the influence that a controlling shareholder exerts whether
or not it fills the board of directors with designees, the standard for judging
all transactions between a firm and its controlling shareholder is "entire fairness."56 A conflicted transaction can arguably be enjoined, even if all individual directors are insulated by 102(b)(7) provisions. If, in fact, the terms
are preferential or below market, that would provide a strong basis for a
claim that the transaction was not entirely fair. Thus, for example, in Kahn
v. Tremont Corp.,57 a case involving a conflict of interest transaction between two corporations controlled by Harold Simmons, the Delaware Su-

54

See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 43, at 772.
[S]o long as the constituency directors' representative capacity is transparently
disclosed to stockholder and fellow directors, constituency directors could be
permitted to advocate the interests of their sponsors. That is, the constituency
directors could attempt to persuade the entire board that their sponsors' interest
represent or are aligned with the interests of the corporation and all its
stockholders.

Id.

55

"[T]he business judgment rule will not be rebutted if the interested directors do not
constitute a majority of the directors approving the transaction." Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (2001)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 814 (Del. 1984)).
56
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del. 1994); Citron v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
57
694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).
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preme Court applied the "entire fairness" standard to the transaction and concluded there was a conflict.58 The court examined director conduct only in
determining whether the special committee had acted sufficiently independently to shift the burden of proof.59 Finally, it seems, we have come up with
a plausible theory of attack under Delaware law.60 Even if the directors acted in good faith, noncontrolling shareholders could plausibly seek to enjoin
the preferential contract.
There may be another scenario for how a case could land in the lap of
the Delaware judiciary. Suppose that the decision to extend the loans is not
made by the board. Rather, the CEO of DMAC may have decided to approve the transaction on his own, after receiving a telephone call from a
Treasury official explaining the importance of the loan to the government.
Indeed, such types of pressure were reportedly applied to Ken Lewis by
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, with respect to whether Bank of America
should disclose to its shareholders the mounting losses at Merrill Lynch,61
and to Fritz Henderson by Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank with
respect to whether GM should close a distribution center Norton, Massachusetts.62
As a matter of corporate law, the officers of the company have the authority to approve many transactions without specific board approval.63 To
the extent that the decision to engage in a transaction is made by an officer,
however, the analysis under section 102(b)(7) is different. Section 102(b)(7)
shields only directors (or, rather, people acting in their capacity as directors)
from monetary liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty.64 Since section

58

Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 428-30.
60
But see Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 27 n. 36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (suggesting that "the
automatic requirement of an entire fairness review" is limited "to the narrow class of cases in which
there is a controlling shareholder on both sides of a challenged merger").
61
See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124045610029046349.html (describing testimony by Ken
Lewis, former CEO of Bank of America, regarding the pressure placed on him by government
officials not to disclose presumptively material information to the company's shareholders).
62
See Joe Weisenthal, Barney Frank Intervenes to Keep Open Massachusetts GM Facility,
BUS. INSIDER (ONLINE), June 5, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/barney-frank-intervenes-tokeep-open-massachussets-gm-facility-2009-6 (reporting on a call placed by Barney Frank to CEO of
GM regarding the closure of a Massachusetts car parts warehouse). The facility was kept open. See
George F. Will, Barney Frank, Car Guy; And Green Guy. So He Pressures GM, NEWSWEEK,
June 22, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/201949.
63
See, e.g., Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350,
352 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931) (stating corporate president's implied powers include "all acts of an
ordinary nature which by usage or necessity are incidents to his office and by virtue of his office he
may enter into a contract and bind his corporation.").
64
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (specifying the "personal liability of a
59
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102(b)(7) does not apply to fiduciary duty breaches by officers acting in their
capacity as officers, it would present no barrier to a lawsuit.
Moreover, a CEO of a government-controlled company is clearly dependent on the goodwill of his controlling shareholder for his continued
tenure. If the CEO caves to governmental pressure, it is at least plausible to
assert that the CEO acted to preserve his own position as an executive, and
not because he sincerely believed that he was serving the best interest of the
corporation. As such, the CEO could be deemed not to have acted in good
faith and section 102(b)(7), even if it were to apply, would not shield him
from monetary liability.65
But while a suit against an officer would have an easier time surviving
a challenge under section 102(b)(7), it raises additional complications as to
whether demand would be excused. Conceptually, for a shareholder to bring
a derivative lawsuit—and most of these lawsuits would be derivative lawsuits66—that shareholder would first have to make a demand on the company's board to bring the lawsuit itself.67 In practice, derivative plaintiffs in
Delaware almost always claim that the demand is excused because it is
futile.68
While Delaware courts ordinarily apply the Aronson test to determine
demand futility,69 in some situations a standard announced by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Rales v. Blasband applies.70 The Rales standard effectively eliminates the second prong of the Aronson test and requires a derivdirector").
65
See id. (stating that director exculpation is not available for "acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law").
66
Derivative lawsuits assert a claim on behalf of the corporation. The most straightforward
way to determine whether a lawsuit is derivative is to inquire whether, if damages are payable, they
would be paid to the corporation or to the shareholders directly. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, &
Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). Additionally, a lawsuit that claims that Company
A extended a loan on preferential terms to Company B, which is controlled by the same
shareholders, is a derivative lawsuit since Company A suffers the harm (it receives a below-market
interest rate) and would receive any damages. See id. (identifying "who suffered the alleged harm
(the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually)" as another method to distinguish direct
from derivative lawsuits).
67
DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)
68
See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of
Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 65 (concluding
that "derivative litigation in the United States nearly always proceeds under the allegation that
demand would be 'futile' and therefore should be excused"); cf. FLI Deep Marine LLC v. McKim,
No. 4138-VCN, 2009 WL 1204363, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2009) ("[W]here a shareholder instead
chooses to make a demand upon the board of directors, she concedes the independence of a majority
of the board . . . and is precluded from . . . arguing that demand should be excused because the
directors are conflicted.").
69
See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
70
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-35 (Del. 1993).
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ative plaintiff to allege specific facts that create a reasonable doubt as to
whether a majority of the board in office at the time demand would have
been made was disinterested or independent.71 Rales is relevant in a case in
which the board, at the time of demand, did not consist of the same members
as the board that approved the challenged transaction.72 The rationale for the
revised test is that, since the incumbent board had no role in approving the
underlying transaction, it is in a position to determine whether a lawsuit
should be brought even if the underlying transaction was not the product of
the valid exercise of business judgment of a different board.73
The Delaware Supreme Court has identified three scenarios in which
the Rales standard applies. The first scenario was the one at issue in Rales:
the challenged decision had been made by the board of a different corporation.74 The second involves a decision made by a board, the majority of
whose members have since been replaced.75 The third scenario, of interest
here, is when the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of
the board.76 "The [Delaware] Supreme Court included the [third] scenario
out of a concern that demand upon a board should not be excused when a
board did not have the opportunity to consider [the] corporate action [at
issue]."77
The third scenario seems to fit the case in which the CEO approves a
transaction under pressure from a government controlling shareholder
without seeking board approval. If Rales applies to this situation, for demand to be excused, a derivative plaintiff would have to raise doubts as to
the disinterestedness and independence of a majority of the board. Inside
directors are generally not regarded as independent of a controlling
shareholder, but generally constitute far less than a majority of a board.
Whether a derivative plaintiff could satisfy the Rales test would thus depend
on whether the plaintiff could adduce sufficient facts to challenge the independence or disinterestedness of a sufficient number of outside directors,
both directors selected by the Treasury and others.
Although our hypothetical seems to fit squarely in the last Rales
scenario, it is not entirely clear that Rales actually applies in this context.

71

Id. at 934.
Id.
73
See id. at 933 ("Where there is no conscious decision by directors to act or refrain from
acting, the business judgment rule has no application." (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813
(Del. 1984))).
74
Rales, 634 A.2d at 934.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 353 n.29 (Del. Ch. 2007).
72
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The underlying rationale for applying Rales to officers' decisions that were
not approved by the board is that the board, not having been involved in the
business decision, is in a good position to determine whether a lawsuit
should proceed. There is no indication that the court, in announcing the
Rales standard, specifically focused on the application of the last Rales
scenario to instances in which the underlying transaction would not be
accorded business judgment protection even if approved by independent
directors. But the application of Rales in that context would generate exactly
the tension that we discussed before: independent directors, who would lack
the power, by approving the transaction, to eliminate substantive judicial
review (through changing the substantive standard to business judgment)
would have the power to eliminate substantive review by refusing to bring a
lawsuit after demand has been made. Moreover, if they would have this
power only in instances in which the underlying transaction was not
submitted to the board (since otherwise Aronson would apply, rather than
Rales), this would generate perverse incentives for companies with
controlling shareholders not to seek prior board approval for suspicious
transactions, incentives that run counter to the process-oriented spirit of
Delaware corporate law. For these reasons, we would regard the issue of
whether Rales applies to such cases as unresolved.
III. WHY DELAWARE SHOULD AVOID A FIGHT WITH WASHINGTON
AND HOW IT SHOULD DO SO: A THEORY OF DUCKING
For some set of transactions, Delaware courts may be asked to look
into transactions in which the government, as controlling shareholder, has a
conflict of interest. But is this good news for Delaware? Should Delaware
want the case? When the politics of automobile industry bailouts is combined with the politics of corporate law, we submit that Delaware will find
itself in an impossible position. Historically, Delaware has generally
avoided fights with Washington.78 If presented with a situation resembling
our hypothetical, Delaware should want to continue that history. It can do so
by "ducking" the case under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19.

78
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 714-15 (concluding "Delaware has so far been
successful in fending off . . . potential threats" to its "dominant position in corporate law"); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1573, 1617 (2005) (stating that Delaware "eschews controversy" and prefers to address
reform through its courts rather than legislation or public hearings).
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A. Is This a Case that Delaware Should Want?
In light of our earlier discussion, let us assume that a claim attacking
the conflicted transaction has been filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery
and will not be removed or dismissed. Consider how it could play out and
what it would mean for Delaware. The core, substantive question would be
whether the Treasury improperly pressured DMAC to loan money to DM on
preferential terms. If litigated in the Court of Chancery, we would enjoy the
spectacle of senior Treasury officials being called to testify under oath in a
deposition or trial regarding the Treasury's role in the transaction.79 There
would be fights over whether a sitting Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury could be forced to testify in a civil suit, whether his actions are
protected by executive privilege, and so forth.
As controversial as these matters would be, imagine what would
happen if a Delaware chancellor actually enjoined the loans from DMAC to
DM or found that corporate directors or officers, acting in accordance with
the Treasury directions, were subject to monetary liability. Congress would
explode in outrage: One of the smallest states in the Union is daring to
interfere with national economic policy! After all, Congressmen would
argue, the taxpayers bailed out DMAC! As majority owners, surely they get
to decide whether to do this or not! Senators would convene hearings:
"we've got the right and responsibility to ask these questions."80 Barney
Frank would come after Delaware for obstructing federal policy. Imagine
the threats from Congress and even the White House to displace Delaware if
it dared to stand in the way of rescuing the automobile industry on behalf of
"fat cats," "speculators" or even "locusts."81

79
To get a sense of the politics of the controversy over the approval of the SEC's settlement
with Bank of America regarding the SEC's disclosure claims arising out of the merger with Merrill
Lynch, see generally Kara Scannell et al., Judge Tosses Out Bonus Deal—SEC Pact with BofA over
Merril Is Slammed; New York Weighs Charges Against Lewis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A1.
See also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rakoff, J.)
(rejecting a proposed consent judgment).
80
Whoriskey & Marr, supra note 7 (quoting Sen. Mark Warner).
81
See Derrick Henry, Obama Decries 'Fat Cat Bankers,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/obama-decries-fat-cat-bankers/ (quoting President
Obama: "'I did not run for office to be helping out a bunch of fat cat bankers on Wall Street'"); Jim
Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy Protection; U.A.W. and Fiat to Take
Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A1 (stating that President Obama refers to objecting
bondholders as "speculators"); Ashley Seager, Germany Pledges Code to Curb Hedge Fund
"Locusts," GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 2007, at 41 (stating that German regulators refer to hedge
funds as "locusts").
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In thinking about Delaware's place in the corporate law landscape, it is
always worth remembering that Congress has sufficient power under the
Commerce Clause to nationalize corporate law.82 It could decide tomorrow
to create a federal incorporation regime that would preempt state corporate
law, thereby putting Delaware out of business. In many respects, the federal
government is not only the controlling shareholder of DMAC, with the power to retaliate, but also has potential control over, and the power to retali-ate
against, Delaware corporate law.
Delaware, of course, derives substantial profits from being the domicile of choice for publicly traded corporations.83 Naturally, Delaware decision makers would not want to endanger the continued flow of these profits
to Delaware residents and the Delaware fisc. As we have discussed elsewhere, Delaware has developed a refined strategy of staying out of the political limelight.84 Although there will always be people attacking Delaware's
position as illegitimate,85 such criticism does not gain political traction so
long as Delaware does not antagonize important organized interests.
From that perspective, taking a stand on controversial and partisan
issues—such as whether, in a specific case, it is legitimate for the federal
government to induce government-controlled companies to take actions
considered by the federal government to be economically beneficial, even if
they do not benefit the minority shareholders in the government-controlled
company—is about the last thing that Delaware would want to do. This
class of cases thus calls for a different strategy which Delaware has sometimes employed in the past:86 the strategy of ducking.
B. A Theory of Ducking
Assuming for now that this is one of those rare situations in which
Delaware should duck, how should it do so? To start, what makes a good
ducking strategy?

82

See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 598 (2003) ("If
Congress wishes, it can swoop in and take over any major aspect of corporate law, as it often has,
and more often has threatened."); Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1585-86.
83
See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002) (describing and quantifying Delaware's benefits).
84
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1617-18.
85
See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Rogue State, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2002, at 20, 23 (stating
that "Delaware's loose rules amount to an invitation to engage in chicanery").
86
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 78, at 1621 (suggesting that Delaware tends to duck "hot
potato" issues such as executive compensation because they are prone to trigger "populist anger").
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First, Delaware should only duck when it is necessary to do so, when
important Delaware interests are at stake. If it ducks unnecessarily, it risks
losing its central position in corporate law.
Second, Delaware should only duck when doing so would be effective
in avoiding a no-win situation. Otherwise, it is pointless. Moreover, it
should only choose instances in which ducking is politically defensible.
Third, if Delaware ducks, it should do so with regard to issues that are
peripheral to Delaware's position in corporate law or which minimally
distort settled doctrine. Thus, preferably, it should find a procedural rather
than a substantive rationale for ducking. Furthermore, in ducking, it should
strive for a facially neutral principle so as not to call unnecessary attention to
itself.
Finally, because of its obligations to the parties, it should try to duck
only when the parties have a plausibly adequate, or superior, alternative
forum in which their claims can be adjudicated.
The Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in In re Bear Stearns Cos.
Shareholder Litigation87 provides an excellent example of an appropriate
and successful duck.88 In order to ensure that its emergency merger with J.P.
Morgan Chase would be approved by its reluctant shareholders, Bear Stearns
issued just under 40% of its shares to J.P. Morgan Chase in a share exchange, with no limit on additional market purchases, thereby rendering the
shareholder vote a fait accompli.89 As we have argued elsewhere, this case
raised difficult and fundamental issues under Delaware law, issues that had
broad implication for shareholders' statutory right to veto mergers and the
fiduciary duties of boards not to undermine this right.90 On the other hand,
the Bear Stearns–J.P. Morgan Chase merger had been pressed by the Fed
and the Treasury as necessary to prevent the collapse of the international
financial system.91
Contemporaneous actions challenging the stock swap were filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery and New York Supreme Court.92 Vice Chancellor Parsons, on motion by the defendants, stayed the Delaware action in

87
No. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 515 (2008).
88
Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 715.
89
In re Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992, at *3, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 519.
90
Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 744.
91
See In re Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992, at *2, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 517
("To preserve the stability and orderliness of the financial markets, the Federal Reserve acted
promptly to resolve the Bear Stearns situation.").
92
Id. at *3, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 519.
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favor of the New York action.93 This stay was necessary because Delaware
was caught on the horns of a dilemma: it would be politically dangerous for
Delaware to confront the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the U. S.
Department of Treasury on a matter with implications for the stability of the
financial system; but upholding the share exchange posed hard questions of
Delaware takeover law.
The stay in favor of the New York case was effective in that it allowed
Delaware to avoid potential conflict with the Fed and politically defensible
in that the stated basis was comity towards a sister state court, a legitimate
and important consideration in a federal system. Though the underlying substantive issue was important for Delaware, the rationale for the ducking was
based on malleable principles of comity jurisprudence, which are both
peripheral to Delaware's corporate law and unlikely to generate a precedent
that future Delaware courts will feel bound to follow. The decision was also
minimal insofar as it avoided the conflict without reworking or unsettling
Delaware substantive mergers and acquisitions law. Moreover, the stay was
facially neutral in that it did not favor plaintiffs or defendants on the merits.
Finally, plaintiffs had a plausibly adequate alternative forum; the New York
Supreme Court had all the parties in front of it and could adjudicate all
claims.94
How might Delaware duck a confrontation with the federal government in our hypothetical suit against DMAC's directors? There are some
bad alternatives. It could, for example, hold the transaction entirely fair even
if it was not. It could refuse to evaluate the entire fairness of the transaction
based on some generally applicable rule, such as a general holding that, if no
individual director has violated his fiduciary duties, self-dealing transactions
with controlling shareholders enjoy the protection of the business judgment
rule, or that demand is not excused in these kinds of cases. It could exploit
judicial discretion in the granting of equitable relief in a way that ignored the
realities of the matter by, for example, refusing to grant an injunction
because there was no irreparable harm or because the risk of harm from
enjoining the loan outweighed the risk to plaintiff of not enjoining.
If, in fact, the loan is not entirely fair, these solutions are clearly problematic. Is there a better way out?

93

Id. at *8, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 527.
See id. at *4, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 520 (stating that "[t]he Delaware Action
closely parallels the New York Action").
94
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C. Ducking Under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19 ("Joinder of Persons Needed for
Just Adjudication") provides the optimal basis for ducking the issues posed
by the hypothetical. Delaware's Rule 19 tracks the comparable Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure:
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the Court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If
the person has not been so joined, the Court shall order that the
person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff
but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or in
a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the
venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from
the action.
(b) Determination by Court whenever joinder not feasible. If a
person as described in paragraph (a)(1) and (2) hereof cannot
be made a party, the Court shall determine whether in equity
and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be
considered by the Court include: First, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial
to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
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absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a
claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader,
of any persons as described in paragraph (a)(1) and (2) hereof
who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 23.95
Notwithstanding the confusing phrasing and structure of the rule, it
provides a fairly straightforward three-step analytic structure.96 First, is the
absentee needed for just adjudication? A party is "required/necessary" if, as
the rule states,
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest.97
Second, is joinder of the necessary absentee feasible? If yes, then the
person must be joined. If, on the other hand, joinder is not feasible, then the
analysis proceeds to the third step—whether the case should proceed or be
dismissed. In other words, should the absentee be regarded as "indispensable?"
Consider, then, how this applies to the question of whether the
Treasury is an "indispensable" party in our hypothetical lawsuit against the
directors. In the first step, one could argue that, as the dominant force apply-

95

DEL. CT. CH. R. 19.
See generally 4 RICHARD D. FREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 19 (3d ed. 1997)
(interpreting the very similar FED. R. CIV. P. 19). Federal court interpretation of parallel court rules
is given "great weight" by Delaware courts. See, e.g., Nat'l Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No.
7278, 1983 WL 8946, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 1983), reprinted in 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 610, 614
(1983) (citing Canaday v. Super. Ct. in and for New Castle County, 119 A.2d 347 (Del. 1955)).
97
DEL. CT. CH. R. 19(a).
96
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ing pressure to proceed with the transaction, the Treasury is a "required" or
"necessary" party. Clearly, the Treasury, as a controlling shareholder, would
be principally liable for any damages awarded to the corporation. As such, it
is unclear whether, in the absence of the Treasury, complete damage relief
could be awarded. Moreover, if the suit is for injunctive relief, the grant of
an injunction would, as a practical matter, impair or impede the Treasury's
ability to protect its interest.
Second, is joinder feasible? In our hypothetical, the answer is clearly
a negative. As discussed above, there is exclusive federal jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1346 and any case would be immediately removed under 28
U.S.C. § 1442.
We thus come to the third and critical step, namely, since joinder of
the Treasury is not feasible, should the case proceed or be dismissed? Under
the rule, there are four factors. "First, to what extent [might] a judgment
rendered in the person's absence . . . be prejudicial to the person or those
already parties[?]"98 Under Delaware case law, "[i]t is not necessary to join
a person whose interests are fully protected by the parties already present in
the case."99 But in our hypothetical, the Treasury and the DMAC directors
who face a claim for damages have conflicting interests, especially if the directors' defense is that "the controlling shareholder made me do it." In such
circumstances, not only will the directors not represent the Treasury's interests, it is also hard to see how they can adequately represent their own interests in the Treasury's absence.
The second factor is "the extent to which, by protective provisions in
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can
be lessened or avoided."100 Joyce v. Cuccia provides an example of a situation in which an absentee's claimed rights to ownership of stock can be protected in crafting judgment.101 In that case, the court refused to find the
absent party who claimed ownership of half of a block of stock to be an indispensable party because "any decree granting specific performance [could]
be made subject to [the absent party's] entitlement to the stock as determined
by [court order]."102 By contrast, one can plausibly argue that the hypothetical presents a unitary issue—is the transaction entirely fair?—and that
there is no way to shape the relief to lessen or avoid prejudice.
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The third factor is "whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate."103 This factor points against holding the Treasury to
be an indispensable party; the transaction could be enjoined and monetary
liability imposed on the directors, if appropriate, in the absence of the
Treasury.
The fourth factor is "whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder."104 This raises the question
whether complete relief would be available in federal court. As with all the
legal issues raised by government control, this is a complicated issue that
does not have a clear answer. The issue is whether fiduciary duty claims
against directors would be within the federal court's "supplemental jurisdiction" ("pendent party jurisdiction") under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Although
§ 1367 codified "pendent party jurisdiction," it only did so for actions in
federal district court. If, as discussed above, a breach of fiduciary duty is a
tort claim for purposes of the FTCA, all claims could be brought in federal
district court and § 1367 would provide for pendent party jurisdiction over
the directors, permitting complete relief. On the other hand, if a breach of
fiduciary duty is not a tort but, instead, a claim for "unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort," the case would fall under the Tucker Act and
would have to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. In that event, the
pre-§ 1367 principles would determine whether there was pendent party jurisdiction (there are no Court of Federal Claims cases on point).
As this analysis of Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 19 suggests,
there is sufficient flexibility within the rule, and sufficient factual basis, for a
court to hold the Treasury to be an "indispensable party." Would it be advisable to do so? Would it be another exemplary duck?
Consider the factors identified above in our theory of ducking. As
noted earlier, avoiding a confrontation with the Treasury and Congress is
important for Delaware as such a confrontation could endanger Delaware's
historic and distinctive role in corporate law and the economic benefits
Delaware obtains from maintaining this role.
Second, a dismissal under Rule 19 would be effective in allowing
Delaware to avoid a conflict. It would leave the substantive decision to the
federal judiciary, a body more insulated against political attacks and with
greater legitimacy in rendering decisions of national importance. Even
though the federal judiciary would apply Delaware corporate law in rendering its decision on the conduct of the officers and directors, the underlying
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fundamental principles—that controlling shareholders may not engage in
unfair transactions—are uncontroversial. The controversial issues—how
should these principles be applied, should they be modified when the controlling shareholder is the federal government and purports to pursue national interest, and was a specific transaction really unfair?—would be determined by federal judges based on the specific facts of a case and without
much guidance from Delaware precedents. Because both federal and Delaware interests support Delaware's abstention, the decision would be
politically defensible.
Third, a dismissal would have minimal impact on settled doctrine.
Because Rule 19 is procedural, a dismissal would avoid any changes to
substantive Delaware corporate law. To the contrary, not rendering a substantive decision in these cases would avoid potential distortions that could
result if Delaware tried to squeeze self-dealing transactions with a governmental controlling shareholder into its general jurisprudence of controlling
shareholder fiduciary duties. Moreover, holding the Treasury to be an indispensable party would be facially neutral inasmuch as it is based on a
plausible interpretation of a long-standing and generally applicable procedural rule.
Finally, the parties would have a plausibly adequate alternative forum
in which all issues could be resolved in a single proceeding, at least if there
is pendent party jurisdiction.
Delaware's central role in corporate law depends on Delaware courts
deciding most important questions that arise under its corporate law. But a
variety of circumstances arise that counsel in favor of not acting. Sometimes, considerations of comity lead Delaware to defer to other states. Federal control of a Delaware corporation, we suggest, is another context in
which discretion is the better part of valor.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last two years, the United States has faced a historic collapse of
its financial markets and its banking sector. In response, the federal government has embarked on unprecedented initiatives. Along the way, it has ended up with control of some major publicly traded Delaware corporations.
Amongst the numerous financial, political, and legal challenges raised by
these initiatives is the effect of government control on Delaware's jurisprudence of controlling shareholders.
It remains to be seen how long this exceptional period will last. If the
Treasury exits from these positions quickly, we may never have to resolve
the legal issues raised by government ownership. If the Treasury holds these
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positions for the long term, a new, federal legal structure will have to be developed, probably involving federal incorporation for the controlled firms.
In the meantime, Delaware should keep its head down. It has nothing
to gain, and much to lose, from a confrontation with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and Congress. So long as it can avoid such conflicts without
doing substantial damage to its law or its place in the corporate land-scape, it
would be well advised to do so.

